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The Role of the Intellectual Property Rights Regime 
for Foreign Investors in Post Socialist Economies1 
Abstract 
We integrate international business theory on foreign direct investment (FDI) with insti 
tutional theory on intellectual property rights (IPR) to explain characteristics and behav 
iour of foreign investment subsidiaries in Central East Europe, a region with an IPR re 
gime gap vis à vis West European countries. We start from the premise that FDI may 
play a crucial role for technological catch up development in Central East Europe via 
technology and knowledge transfer. By use of a unique dataset generated at the IWH in 
collaboration with a European consortium in the framework of an EU project, we assess 
the role played by the IPR regimes in a selection of CEE countries as a factor for corpo 
rate governance and control of foreign invested subsidiaries, for their own technological 
activity, their trade relationships, and networking partners for technological activity. As 
a specific novelty to the literature, we assess the influence of the strength of IPR regimes 
on corporate control of subsidiaries and conclude that IPR sensitive foreign investments 
tend to have lower functional autonomy, tend to cooperate more intensively within their 
transnational  network  and  yet  are  still  technologically  more  active  than  less  IPR 
sensitive subsidiaries. In terms of economic policy, this leads to the conclusion that the 
FDI will have a larger developmental impact if the IPR regime in the host economy is 
sufficiently strict. 
 
JEL:  F21, F23, O31, O34 
Keywords: Foreign Direct Investment, Intellectual Property Rights, Technology Trans 
fer, Corporate Governance and Control, R&D and Innovation 
 
                                                 
1  This  report  has  been  prepared  for  the  STREP  project  “Understanding  the  Relationship  between 
Knowledge and Competitiveness in the Enlarging EU”, financially supported by the EU 6th Frame 
work Programme (contract number CIT5 028519). The authors are solely responsible for the con 
tents, the EU assumes no responsibility for any use that might be made of data appearing in this pub 
lication. Comments received by two anonymous referees for the EIBA 2008 conference are most gra 
tefully acknowledged.   
IWH __________________________________________________________________ 
 
IWH-Diskussionspapiere 4/2009  4
The Role of the Intellectual Property Rights Regime 
for Foreign Investors in Post-Socialist Economies 
Zusammenfassung 
Wir kombinieren die zwei Theoriegebäude der International-Business- und der Institutio-
nenökonomie, um die Charakteristika und das Verhalten von ausländischen Direktinves-
titionen (ADI) in den Ländern Mittel- und Osteuropas zu untersuchen, die sich unter an-
derem durch einen relativ zu den entwickelteren westlichen Ländern geringeren Schutz 
intellektueller  Eigentumsrechte  auszeichnen.  Wir  gehen  von  der  Annahme  aus,  dass 
ADIs einen wichtigen Entwicklungsbeitrag in diesen Ländern leisten können, indem sie 
Technologie und Wissen transportieren. Unter Verwendung einer einzigartigen Daten-
bank, die durch das Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung Halle (IWH) in Kooperation mit 
einem internationalen Konsortium im Rahmen eines EU-Projektes generiert wurde, unter-
suchen wir für eine Auswahl von Post-Transformationsländern die Rolle, die das Regime 
intellektueller Eigentumsrechte (IPR-Regime) für die entwicklungsfördernden Potenzia-
le von ADI hat. Diese Rolle wird vermittelt durch die Corporate-Governance-Strukturen 
zwischen  Investoren  und  Töchtern,  die  technologische  Aktivität  von  Tochterunter-
nehmen in der Region, ihre Handelsbeziehungen insbesondere mit der Gastökonomie 
und die Netzwerkbeziehungen für ihre technologische Aktivität. Ein Neuigkeitswert der 
Untersuchung besteht in der Analyse des Verhältnisses zwischen der Stärke des IPR-
Regimes und der Kontrollmechanismen zwischen Investoren und Töchtern. Die Ergeb-
nisse deuten darauf hin, dass diejenigen ADI-Projekte, die eines besonderen Schutzes 
durch das IPR-Regime bedürfen, typischerweise eine geringere funktionelle Autonomie 
aufweisen, sich in ihren Kooperationen stärker auf das Netzwerk des ausländischen In-
vestors konzentrieren und dennoch eine höhere technologische Aktivität aufweisen. Für 
die Wirtschaftspolitik kann daraus geschlossen werden, dass ADI dann einen besonders 
intensiven  Entwicklungsbeitrag  leisten  können,  wenn  das  Gastland  sein  IPR-Regime 
möglichst streng ausgestaltet. 
 
JEL:  F21, F23, O31, O34 
Schlüsselwörter:  ausländische Direktinvestitionen, intellektuelle Eigentumsrechte, Tech-
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The Role of the Intellectual Property Rights Regime 
for Foreign Investors in Post Socialist Economies 
1  Introduction 
Foreign direct investment plays a particularly important role for catch up development 
where investment from technologically advanced regions in less advanced regions leads 
to the transfer and dissemination of knowledge into the host economy. This may be par 
ticularly important for post transition economies in Central East Europe (CEE): here, in 
tegration into the European division of labour in general and technological catching up 
remain the most important tasks. Those economies were disconnected from economic 
activity and technical progress in the Western world for an extended period of time, sig 
nificant productivity gaps are still prevalent, and their closure constitutes the prime con 
cern for catch up development to West European levels (see e.g. Stephan 2003). Whilst 
foreign direct investment (FDI) is largely perceived as the one vehicle in support of such 
catching up, it remains an open issue of whether inflowing FDI actually serves to assist 
their host economies by way of technology and knowledge transfer or whether low fac 
tor costs (here mainly labour costs) reduce FDI to ‘extended workbenches’ and make 
them a rather ineffective tool for catch up development. Where investors have a large 
ownership  advantage  in  terms  of  their  endowment  with  knowledge,  the  question 
emerges as to how investors protect their knowledge from unwanted use by (potential) 
competitors in the investment hosting economy, and whether foreign investors actually 
transfer significant technology and knowledge to host economies with relatively weaker 
intellectual property rights regimes (IPR regimes). The scores for the ‘IP Rights Protec 
tion’ within the 2007 ‘International Property Rights Index’ (of the Washington based 
IPRI) clearly rate the countries in CEE lower than the typical countries where foreign 
investors in CEE originate: Germany ranks first with a level of 8.8 on a scale between 0 
(intellectual property protection is weak or non existent) to 10 (is equal to the world’s 
most stringent protection), 8.6 for Finland, 8.3 for the UK, 8.2 for France, 8.2 for Japan, 
8.0 for the US, and 8.6 for Austria. For the CEEs that form part of our analysis, the 
scores are much lower: 3.4 for Romania, 5.3 for Poland, 4.5 for Croatia (was not avail 
able in the 2007 report, the index provided here is from the 2008 report), and 5.8 for 
Slovenia  (was  also  not  available  in  the  2007 report,  index  is  from  the  2008 report) 
(http://internationalpropertyrightsindex.org, accessed April 2008). The ‘Protection of in 
tellectual  property’  section  of  the  2005/2006  Global  Competitiveness  Report  of  the 
World Economic Forum (WEF) lends further support to this: Germany again scores first 
with 6.6 (where 7 is equal to the world’s most stringent intellectual property protection 
and 1 equals weak or nonexistent protection). Finland scores 6.4, UK 6.2, France and  
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Japan 5.9, US 5.7, and Austria 5.6. Amongst the post transition economies rated, we 
find: 3.0 for Romania, 3.6 for Poland, 3.2 for Croatia, and 4.4 for Slovenia. 
The  main  research  question  of  this  paper  is  hence  whether  particularly  knowledge 
intensive investors in a selection of CEE countries are in fact particularly active in terms 
of technology and rely on their existing IPR regimes to protect unwarranted use of the 
knowledge advantage? Or do those investors rather refrain from cooperating and trading 
with the local economy and prefer extra close ties of control with their subsidiaries to 
prevent the diffusion of technology? The focus here is on the influence of IPR regimes 
in Central East Europe on the behaviour and characteristics of their inward foreign di 
rect investment, including corporate governance/control of subsidiaries and their trade 
and networking partners for their technological activity. There is a striking gap in the 
literature where the two issues of transnational companies (TNC) and IPR merge: so far, 
literature is mainly concerned with the kind of foreign investment made in weak IPR re 
gimes and rather little is known about the behaviour and corporate governance of FDI 
in weak IPR systems. 
For our analysis, we use a unique dataset on FDI subsidiaries in East Germany, Poland, 
Croatia, Romania, and Slovenia (the IWH FDI database). Following a brief overview of 
the state of the art in research on the effect of IPR on FDI, the paper develops a set of 
testable hypothesis derived from this literature. After describing the data used and a 
short presentation of the most important stylised facts of the issues at hand, empirical 
analysis is used to test our hypothesis. The final chapter discusses the results of the em 
pirical analysis in light of economic policy where such is dedicated to improving the 
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2  Theory and Related Empirical Works 
Most of the literature on the nexus between FDI and IPR is concerned with the influence 
of IPR on the extent and character that internationalisation decisions of firms assume. 
Internationalisation describes a firm moving beyond its own national borders either to 
service foreign markets or to acquire assets abroad, and may take the form of exporting, 
foreign direct investment, joint ventures, or licensing (see for the transition countries 
from the point of view of institutions and transaction costs: Meyer 2001). All those 
forms of internationalisation are in fact associated with the danger that the firm may lose 
control over its original knowledge based asset to competing firms – even though to 
varying degrees. Amongst the factors affecting this danger, the institution of the national 
IPR regime – or rather its effective implementation – is certainly the most prominent 
one. Institutions (such as the IPR regime) not only define the rules of the game, they 
also determine directly “what arrows a firm has in its quiver as it struggles to formulate 
and implement strategy and to create competitive advantage” (Ingram and Silverman 
2002, p. 20) or defend its intellectual property, as we would want to add at this point: 
where the IPR regime offers powerful legal instruments to fight unwarranted dissipation 
of knowledge assets, a firm may feel more comfortable with foreign investments and 
vice versa (for an appreciation of institutional theory in the area of foreign investors’ 
strategies, see Meyer and Peng 2005, p. 610 611).  
The OLI paradigm of Dunning (1993) is concerned with foreign direct investment as 
one form of internationalisation, but the model can be generalized: a firm will only un 
dertake a FDI in a certain country (or internationalise), if the firm possesses an owner 
ship advantage. This ownership advantage allows the internationalising firm to compete 
more successfully than domestic firms in the host economy. This advantage is needed to 
compensate the disadvantage the foreign firm faces in an unknown foreign environment. 
Still, the internationalising firm containing the ownership advantage could export to the 
new foreign market instead of establishing a FDI subsidiary. Hence, in order to distin 
guish between exporting and FDI, the host economy has to offer an additional localiza 
tion advantage: the host country has to possess attributes for production that are superior 
to the home country of the foreign firm. Maskus (1998, p. 121 122) emphasises the role 
of different kinds of knowledge for inflows of FDI: the knowledge giving rise to the 
ownership advantage will predominantly be of an intangible character (e.g. trademark or 
reputation for quality) or a product or production process inaccessible to other firms 
(such as a patent or trade secret), and ‘multiplant economies’ can best be exploited by 
firms developing easily transferable knowledge that needs protection from unwarranted 
use. 
With respect to kind of internationalisation, literature holds that firms will bias their in 
ternationalisation efforts on exporting and less on FDI where weak IPR regimes offer 
little protection of ownership advantages, whereas other forms like joint ventures and li 
censing take precedence in environments with strong IPR systems (e.g. Nunnenkamp  
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and Spatz 2003; Smarzynska 2004). Park and Lippoldt (2005) as well as Nicholson 
(2007) come to the conclusion that at certain levels of IPR protection, FDI may will be 
substituted by licensing. 
The amount of FDI inflows will tend to increase with the strength of IPR protection (e.g. 
Braga and Fink 1989, p. 172; Maskus 1998), as does the amount of direct technology 
transferred (Branstetter et al. 2005). Likewise will the quality of technology transferred in 
internationalisation strategies increase (e.g. Rockett 1990; Park and Lippoldt 2005). The 
explanation behind these patterns is that companies that possess valuable knowledge as 
sets are deterred from investing and transferring sensitive knowledge into countries where 
their knowledge can easily be copied and used by competitors without fear of sanctions. 
Pertaining to transition economies in Eastern Europe, case studies conducted by Sharp and 
Barz (1997) conclude for the chemical and pharmaceutical industries that companies pay 
close attention to the risk of piracy due to weak IPR protection, and are therefore sceptical 
about transferring technology to those countries. Other empirical studies show a more 
complex relationship between IPR protection and FDI: e.g. Park and Lippoldt (2003) find 
a positive association of IPR and FDI, but the effect depends on the starting point of the 
IPR regime. The reform of a weaker initial level of IPR protection leads to a higher rise in 
FDI. For firms, changes to the better appear to have been more important than the current 
national state of the art in the strength of the IPR system. 
Because sectors differ in the ability to generate product and process innovations and to 
copy  knowledge  and  technology  from  others  (imitation),  the  IPR  issue  is  typically 
treated as an industrial branch specific problem: industries like the chemical or pharma 
ceuticals depend more heavily on IPR protection whereas sectors like manufacturing of 
basic metals or food products are rather less affected by the quality of the IPR regime in 
the host economy. The distinction between IPR sensitive sectors and IPR insensitive 
sectors was first described by Mansfield (1986, later revisited in 1995) and is ever since 
widely cited by other researchers in papers on this issue (see e.g. Lee and Mansfield 
1996;  Maskus  2000,  Table  1,  p.  6;  Nunnenkamp  and  Spatz  2003;  Ostergard  2000; 
Smarzynska 2004 and UNCTAD 1993). Extending the list, Band and Katoh (1995) and 
Ebanks (1989) find the software and entertainment industries as particularly depending 
on IPR protection via patent and copyright (alas, those sectors are not included in our 
database).  Possibly,  the  1986 study  could  not  identify  those  two  sectors  as  IPR 
sensitive, because technology in these fields evolved in large leaps ever since that time. 
The issue is also treated as specific to the kind of technology involved: standardized, la 
bour intensive production depends on IPRs to a lesser degree than complex but easily 
copied product technologies such as pharmaceuticals (see e.g. Maskus 2000). 
Perhaps even more importantly, the decision about the extent and character of interna 
tionalisation is treated as specific to the type of investment or business functions of the 
subsidiary: here, distinction is made between sales and distribution outlets (depending 
the least on IPR regimes), rudimentary production and assembly, manufacture of com  
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ponents or complete products, and finally R&D as depending the most on strong IPR 
protection (e.g. Mansfield 1993, p. 112; Mansfield 1995). With respect to R&D, Nun 
nenkamp and Spatz (2003) find that the strengthening of the IPR regime not only affects 
the amount of inward FDI but also the amount of R&D expenditure by foreign subsidi 
aries (this is complemented by an increase in value added and exports created by sub 
sidiaries, ibid., p. 39). Lee and Mansfield (1996) hold for the chemical industry that FDI 
subsidiaries in countries with strong IPR regimes tend to conduct more R&D and have a 
higher production than their counterparts in weaker IPR systems. Maskus (1998) comes 
to the conclusion that a strengthening of an IPR regime in a country is followed by an 
increase in the number of patent applications by foreign subsidiaries and an increase in 
affiliate sales of patented products. Nunnenkamp and Spatz (2003) find that a shift to a 
stronger IPR system raises the amount of exports and R&D by FDI subsidiaries. Inter 
estingly, some foreign investment subsidiaries often conduct R&D even if their host 
economy IPR regime is considered weak (Zhao 2004). Examining this puzzle, Zhao 
coins the expression of “internalization arbitrage” (p. 2) by which multinational enter 
prises (MNE) locate only a particular part of R&D in less protected host economies. 
This part is either not easily copied or provides little value without its complementary 
R&D (which is then located in better protected locations of the MNE). Possibly, some 
of  this  R&D  is  targeted  at  increasing  the  absorptive  capabilities  at  the  technology 
receiving end (Cohen and Levinthal 1989). Additional explanations for this puzzle may 
be found in Levin et al. (1987) and include mechanisms like the exploitation of lead 
time or head start, moving rapidly down the learning curve, the use of complementary 
sales and service capabilities, and finally outright secrecy2, to exploit technology and 
knowledge generated in locations with weak protection. 
As a further dimension of the relationship between FDI and IPR, the literature assesses 
the degree of ownership in the foreign invested company (e.g. Nunnenkamp and Spatz 
2003, p. 14 or Braga and Fink 1989, p. 173), with weaker IPR regimes typically associ 
ated with higher ownership shares. It is in particular this last dimension that comes close 
to the corporate governance issue targeted in this analysis. 
Our paper makes use of the insights generated by this literature and focuses on the char 
acter of international production contracting with an intermediate level of danger in 
volved for the firm to lose its ownership advantage: foreign direct investment. Here, the 
investor  comes  sufficiently  close  to  the  foreign  host  economy  production  system  to 
make productive use of its potentials, and is still able to keep its knowledge based assets 
from unwanted exploitation by host economy competitors by closely controlling its sub 
sidiary. 
                                                 
2  A survey of nearly 1 500 R&D manufacturing laboratories in the United States shows that 51% of in 
novations were protected by trade secrets and only 35% by patents (Cohen et al. 2000). This promo 
tes the authors of the World Investment Report (U CTAD 2005, p. 209) to assume that “[t]o the ex 
tent that the R&D process involves sensitive information, TNCs will always seek to protect trade sec 
rets against disclosure.”  
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3  Hypothesis about the Role of IPR Regimes  
for Foreign Investors’ Strategies 
According to the literature, the amount and quality of direct technology transferred to 
FDI  subsidiaries positively  depends  on the strength of the protection of firm owned 
knowledge by the IPR regime (see e.g. Rockett 1990; Park and Lippoldt 2005; Bran 
stetter et al. 2005). We assume that an FDI subsidiary will become sensitive to the 
strength of the IPR regime if the product and process technology it receives from the 
foreign investor is particularly important or if the subsidiary has acquired and purchased 
external knowledge. This we use to proxy the firm specific sensitivity to IPR protection 
of knowledge ownership (see the below construction of the proxy).  
We learn from Mansfield (1993, p. 112, and 1995) that with sales and distribution out 
lets depending the least on IPR regimes, FDI projects in host economies with weaker 
IPR regimes will be able to carry knowledge and technology worth protecting if the 
main focus is on a mandate of sales and distribution outlets. We may extend this line of 
reasoning to other strategic motives: following key clients that moved to the host econ 
omy may also offer some guarantee that the main cooperation partner of the subsidiary 
belongs to a group which already has a proven record of appreciating intellectual prop 
erty rights. If a foreign investment is made with a focus on location bound natural re 
sources, the subsidiary will tend to be rather vertically integrated with the parent firms 
with little interaction necessary with the host economy. The danger of losing intellectual 
property may hence be rather little here as well. Quite on the contrary, however, if ac 
cessing location bound knowledge, skills, and technology, e.g. via cooperation with host 
economy local firms and organisations, is the main strategic motive, then this should co 
incide with rather lower levels of IPR sensitivity, as here the danger of leaking of firm 
specific knowledge is clearly relevant.3 Our first set of four hypotheses are hence that: 
H1:  The more important the strategic motive of the foreign investor to access a new 
market or to increase the existing share on the domestic market, the more an FDI 
may afford to be sensitive to the strength of the IPR system in the host economy if 
the IPR regime there is weaker. 
H2:  The more important the strategic motive of the foreign investor to follow key cli 
ents abroad, the more an FDI may afford to be sensitive to the strength of the IPR 
system in the host economy if the IPR regime there is weaker. 
                                                 
3   We do not think that the strategic motive to increase efficiency across the foreign owner network 
(e.g. via lower labour cost in our selection of host countries) should influence the degree to which an 
FDI project is sensitive to IPR protection. To control for firm heterogeneity, this strategic motive is 
however included in the analysis.  
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H3:  The more important the strategic motive of the foreign investor to tap location 
bound  natural  resources,  the  more  an  FDI  may  afford  to  be  sensitive  to  the 
strength of the IPR system in the host economy if the IPR regime there is weaker. 
H4:  The more important the strategic motive of the foreign investor to access location 
bound knowledge, skills, and technology, the less an FDI may afford to be sensi 
tive to the strength of the IPR system in the host economy if the IPR regime there 
is weaker. 
From Lee and Mansfield (1996) as well as Nunnenkamp and Spatz (2003), we learn that 
parent companies tend to place less R&D with foreign investment subsidiaries in host 
countries with less stringent IPR regimes. This is particularly pronounced for subsidiar 
ies in the sectors that depend heavily on IPR protection. We hence hypothesise: 
H5:  The more an FDI is sensitive to the strength of the IPR system in the host econ 
omy, the less it will conduct R&D in the host economy if the IPR regime there is 
weaker. 
Qualifying this hypothesis, we can alternatively follow Zhao (2004) in that multinational 
firms are able to substitute the weakness of IPR regimes by “internalization arbitrage” 
and Levin et al. (1987) stressing the role of competitive advantage by lead time or head 
start, by rapidly moving down the learning curve, by use of complementary sales and 
service capabilities, and by way of business secrecy. The opposite may hence also turn 
out to be true. 
Spending less on R&D, subsidiaries will likewise generate a lower number of innova 
tions. Following Maskus (1998), we should assume that the stronger a host economy 
IPR regime, the higher the number of innovations and patent applications by the foreign 
subsidiary. This gives rise to the hypothesis: 
H6:  The more an FDI is sensitive to the strength of the IPR system in the host econ 
omy, the less it will generate innovations in the host economy if the IPR regime 
there is weaker. 
If TNCs do locate R&D and generate innovations in countries with weak IPR systems, 
they  will  tend  to  protect  their  newly  generated  knowledge.  Nunnenkamp  and  Spatz 
(2003, p. 14) and Braga and Fink (1989, p. 173 suggest that a foreign investor may alle 
viate the weaknesses of a weak IPR regime by way of corporate control. Controlling 
subsidiaries may involve a high equity share or alternatively may involve the tying of 
the subsidiary’s business functions to the control of the parent company. The autonomy 
issue is in fact an original contribution to the literature: whilst autonomy as corporate 
governance instrument does form part in the international business literature with re 
spect to enterprise restructuring and performance (see e.g. Buck et al. 2003) or with re 
spect to technology transfer from parent to subsidiary (see e.g. Stephan et al. 2005). The 
foreign investment subsidiaries corporate control issue has so far however not been ap  
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plied to the issue of protection of intellectual ownership and IPR. In this context, involv 
ing two not necessarily complementary tools4 to substitute a weak IPR system, we hy 
pothesise: 
H7a: The more an FDI is sensitive to the strength of the IPR system in the host econ 
omy, the higher the equity share of the parent in the subsidiary if the IPR regime is 
weaker. 
H7b: The more an FDI is sensitive to the strength of the IPR system in the host econ 
omy, the lower the autonomy of the subsidiary on its business functions if the IPR 
regime is weaker. 
Another way of controlling subsidiaries may well take a form of restricting the coopera 
tion conducted by the subsidiary to the members of the TNC’s network: this way, the 
subsidiary is restricted in its tapping of sources for R&D and innovation to the TNC 
network and hence may reduce the risk of losing control of its ownership advantages in 
terms of knowledge and technology. This translates into the hypothesis: 
H8:  The more an FDI is sensitive to the strength of the IPR system in the host econ 
omy, the more it will tend to cooperate technologically with the foreign direct in 
vestment network and the less with domestic players if the IPR regime is weaker. 
It is in particular the two latter control mechanisms (autonomy belonging to corporate 
governance and intra TNC cooperation describing a form of behaviour) that may be 
considered new to the literature. To the best of our knowledge, these issues have not yet 
been analysed in the framework of the relationship between FDI and IPR. 
                                                 
4  From the literature, we would typically expect corporate governance via ownership shares and func 
tional autonomy to be positively correlated. In transition economies, this relationship seems to be 
more complicated (see e.g. Karhunen et al., 2008).  
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4  Data and Stylised Facts 
For the analysis, we use the IWH Foreign Direct Investment Database. In this micro 
database, 736 foreign investment subsidiaries from East Germany, Poland, Croatia, Ro 
mania, and Slovenia were interrogated by use of a 5 page questionnaire in the course of 
2006 and early 2007. The questions focus on 4 areas: (i) characterisation of FDIs (size, 
sector,  strategic  motive,  etc.),  (ii)  relationship  between  subsidiaries  and  headquarter 
(corporate governance literature), (iii) subsidiaries’ own technological activities (R&D 
and innovation), and (iv) technological linkages with the host economy (i.e. embedded 
ness or role of FDI in local innovation system). Foreign invested subsidiaries were de 
fined with a foreign equity share5 of at least 10 per cent. The questionnaires were sent 
out either to the firms and/or data was collected by way of CATI telephone interviews. 
The rate of return of the field study comes close to 20 per cent (this is difficult to deter 
mine exactly, because some of the firms were interviewed on the telephone). So far, data 
collection was conducted in one wave (though builds upon a prior field study involving 
foreign invested subsidiaries in CEECs in 2002 and 2003). The resulting cross sectional 
database does however contain some lagged variables, where questions were asked for 
the situation in 2002 and 2005, as the last available complete financial year (e.g. for 
sales, employment, R&D). This restricts the analysis to a rather static analysis even 
though IPR regimes have dynamically evolved over a relatively short period of time. 
However, as we interrogated firms in their behaviour in a particular point of time and 
because we link this to the state of the art in the countries’ IPR regimes at the same 
point of time, a static analysis may be justified. 
The database is in fact representative of the whole population of foreign invested sub 
sidiaries in terms of shares of industrial branches and is the first of its kind to allow de 
tailed structural, technological, and governance analyses of foreign investors in a selec 
tion of Central East European and East German manufacturing industries. In this analy 
sis, we however only use the data for Poland, Croatia, Romania, and Slovenia (with a 
total number of observations of 514). East Germany is not considered, because we may 
assume that the quality of the IPR system in this region corresponds to the one of West 
Germany and is hence very high. Alas, we are interested in the characteristics and be 
haviour of foreign investment subsidiaries in host economies with an IPR regime gap 
vis à vis West European countries: in the group of countries that form part of our analy 
sis, the IPR regime is clearly weaker than in the typical home countries of foreign inves 
tors. 
Because these countries were virtually closed economies with respect to foreign invest 
ment from the West before 1989 (Meyer 1995; Dunning and Rojec 1993; Hunya 1997), 
our dataset consists predominately of investments undertaken after 1989: in fact, only 
                                                 
5   In our database, a foreign owner or shareholder can be a person, an industrial firm, a financial inves 
tor, or a foundation abroad.   
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eight investments in our dataset were made before 1989 (of which are five into East 
Germany in the second half of the 1980s): Amongst our countries, Slovenia was proba 
bly the most protective of FDI and nevertheless had accumulated an FDI stock of nearly 
9.5 per cent of GDP by 1995 and nearly 21 per cent by 2003. Romania started to receive 
noticeable amounts only after 1996 and accumulated a comparable stock by 2003. Po 
land experienced large FDI inflows right after the start of the transition process whilst 
Croatia started to receive noticeable amounts only after 1995. Still, Croatia’s stock per 
GDP in 2003 already surpassed that of Poland with nearly 32 per cent and nearly 24 per 
cent  respectively.6  Of course, Poland and Romania are much larger economies than 
Croatia and Slovenia with Croatia and Slovenia around half the size of Romania’s GDP 
and around one eighth of Poland’s GDP. 
In the database, we define a proxy for foreign invested subsidiaries that can be assumed 
to be particularly sensitive to IPR protection. This proxy forms the numerical sum of 
two dummy variables from the database. The proxy ranks between values of 0 and 2, 
whereby the number increases with the assumed sensitivity of the firm (IPR_sensitivity). 
We determine the degree of firm sensitivity to IPR protection:  
1  the  “acquisition  and  purchase  of  external  knowledge  from  abroad” 
(d_Aquisition) is considered as a particularly important source for its R&D 
and innovation; 
  or 
  “existing technology of your T C group embodied in products you already 
produce without substantial adjustments” (d_TechGroup) is considered as a 
particularly important source of technological knowledge for its R&D or 
innovation activities; 
2  (d_Aquisition) and (d_TechGroup) are both considered as particularly impor 
tant sources at the same time; 
0  if  neither  (d_Aquisition)  or  (d_TechGroup)  are  considered  as  particularly 
important sources. 
The total number of 514 subsidiaries in Central East Europe breaks down into 219 most 
sensitive subsidiaries (IPR sensitivity = 2), 141 with a medium level of sensitivity, and 
the remaining 91 subsidiaries that are not so easily influenced by the quality of the IPR 
regime (see Table 1). In terms of host countries for the FDI subsidiaries, Romania as 
sumes the largest share with 43% or 220 subsidiaries, and Slovenia is the lowest with 
8% and 40 observations. Within countries, the highest shares for the group of most sen 
                                                 
6   Whilst Slovenia and Croatia both belonged to former Yugoslavia and therefore had more elements of 
a market economy than in our two other countries, Croatia’s economic development and systemic 
transformation was retarded significantly during war time.  
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sitive subsidiaries are in Croatia with 50% and Poland with 79%. In Slovenia, the three 
sensitivity groups are of equal size, and in Romania, the largest group has a medium 
level of sensitivity. 
To test our hypothesis, we use ten factors (the strategic investment motives of the for 
eign investor, R&D intensity, innovation intensity, equity share held by the foreign in 
vestor, the level of autonomy of the subsidiary in deciding upon business functions, co 
operation within versus outside the TNC network, the WEF indicator for the strength of 
the national IPR regime, a classification of countries of origin according to their respec 
tive strengths of IPR regimes, and finally age and size of the subsidiary) and four sets of 
dummies (a dummy for true MNCs with subsidiaries in more than two foreign host 
countries, a dummy for greenfield investments, and finally two sets of dummies for in 
dustrial sectors). 
Table 1: 
Stylised facts: IPR sensitivity by countries 
  Croatia  Poland  Romania  Slovenia  Total 
  obs  share  obs  share  obs  share  obs  share  obs  share 
d_Aquisition = 0  55  41%  14  13%  106  57%  19  56%  194  42% 
d_Aquisition = 1  79  59%  94  87%  80  43%  15  44%  268  58% 
d_TechGroup = 0  47  35%  12  11%  65  34%  15  44%  139  30% 
d_TechGroup = 1  88  65%  94  89%  124  66%  19  56%  325  70% 
IPR sensitivity = 0  33  25%  4  4%  43  24%  11  33%  91  20% 
IPR sensitivity = 1  32  24%  18  17%  80  44%  11  33%  141  31% 
IPR sensitivity = 2  66  50%  83  79%  59  32%  11  33%  219  49% 
Total sample   144  28%  110  21%  220  43%  40  8%  514  100% 
* Due to rounding off, the shares may not add up to 100%. 
Source:  IWH FDI database. 
As strategic investment motives of the foreign investor, we allow for a set of five mo 
tives (with the possibility of multiple motives, but all ranked), be they (i) to access a 
new market or to increase the existing share on the domestic market (Market), (ii) to fol 
low foreign key clients that moved to your country (Follow), (iii) to increase efficiency 
across the foreign owner network, such as labour cost etc. (Efficiency), (iv) to access lo 
cation bound natural resources (Resources), and/or (v) to access location bound knowl 
edge, skills, or technology (Technology). Those motives relate to the strategic motive as 
of the time of the field study, i.e. 2006 and early 2007, and again may assume values be 
tween 1 for subsidiaries that hold that their investors value a particular motive as “not  
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important” to 2 for “little importance”, 3 for “important”, 4 for “very important”, and 5 
for “extremely important”. 
The indicator R&D is measured as the annual expenditure on R&D and innovation (in 
cluding external R&D services) in 2005 as a percentage of total sales of the firm. Inno 
vation is scaled 0 to 4, with 0 denoting no innovations between 2002 and 2005, 1 denot 
ing either product innovations, process innovations, marketing innovations, or organisa 
tional innovations.7 2 denotes a random combination of two types of innovations during 
the period, 3 a random combination of three types, and 4 describes a subsidiary that has 
produced all four kinds of innovations. No distinction was made between differing in 
tensities of innovation in terms of the total number of innovations generated. 
Our indicator Equity share is the total share of equity held by the foreign investor in 
2006 and early 2007. Next to equity share, we test corporate control between headquar 
ter and subsidiary by way of autonomy vis à vis the foreign investor enjoyed by the sub 
sidiary in deciding upon business functions. The extent of autonomy is proxied by an 
other additive indicator generated from the sum of three dummies (Autonomy): each 
dummy depicts whether a specific business function is either undertaken by the foreign 
investor or by the subsidiary. The business functions considered are “basic and applied 
research”, “product development”, and “process engineering”. The dummies assume a 
value of 1 if the function is undertaken totally or mainly by the subsidiary and 0 if the 
function is undertaken totally or mainly by the foreign investor. The autonomy proxy 
hence assumes values between 0 and 3 with increasing levels of subsidiary autonomy in 
business functions. 
Our proxy for the technological cooperation of the subsidiary distinguishes between co 
operation  within  the  TNC  network  and  cooperation outside the TNC network. Both 
forms of cooperation range from 1 for subsidiaries that view cooperation with either 
partner as “not important” to 2 for “little importance”, 3 for “important”, 4 for “very im 
portant”, and 5 for “extremely important”. A comparison is made between the relative 
firm specific  levels  of  importance  attached  to  either  partner  and  the  proxy  (Coop 
comparison)  assumes  a  value  of  −1  where  cooperation  within  the  TNC  network  is 
deemed to be less important than cooperation outside the network; a value of 0 where 
both  levels  of  importance  are  equal  and  +1  where  internal  network  cooperation  is 
viewed as more important than external cooperation. 
Further measures that control for firm specific heterogeneity are the subsidiaries’ sizes 
(in employment) and ages (in years since entry of the foreign investor into the subsidi 
ary). Then, we include one indicator for the institutional environment, the quality or 
strength of the national IPR regime (IPR country index), as estimated by the World 
Economic  Forum  (WEF)  in  its  ‘Protection  of  intellectual  property’  section  of  the 
                                                 
7   The technological indicators (innovations and R&D) have been collected according to the internatio 
nal guidelines of the Oslo Manual and the Frascati Manual.  
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2005/2006 Global Competitiveness Report: because we assume a high correlation be 
tween GDP per capita as an indicator of the level of economic development (regardless 
whether this is measured in Euros or in power purchasing parities) and the strength of 
the respective country’s IPR regime8, we may treat this indicator as one that not only 
controls for country specifics (as country dummies would), but also includes a very im 
portant additional piece of information on country differences. This compares to the 
quality of the IPR regime in the country of origin (Origin): the variable classifies coun 
tries into three groups with increasing quality of IPR regimes: the first class assumes a 
value of 3 and includes the countries of Austria, Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, 
Finland, France, Germany, Great Britain, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Japan, Lichtenstein, 
Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Saudi Arabia, Spain, Sweden, Switzer 
land, Taiwan, and the US. The second class assumes a value of 2 and includes China, 
Cypress, Czech Republic, Greece, Hungary, India, Italy, Croatia, Malta, Mexico, Pa 
nama, Poland, Romania, Slovenia, Slovak Republic, and Turkey. Finally the third group 
with a value of 1 comprises Bosnia and Russia (obviously, only the countries are classi 
fied that form part in our database as countries of origin for investments in our selection 
of countries). 
We use dummies to further control for firm heterogeneity and industry heterogeneity: 
first,  we  distinguish  between  true  multinational  companies  d_M E  (i.e.  subsidiaries 
having establishments in at least one third country next to the host and the home coun 
try) that are particularly large (i.e. above 250 employees or 50 mil Euro turnover) and 
from subsidiaries with transnational investors with only one foreign market. Second, we 
identify true greenfield investments if the initial mode of entry of the foreign investor 
was a partial or full ownership in or of a completely new enterprise (d_Green).  
Finally, we control for industry differences in the sensitivity to the protection of knowl 
edge ownership by use of two alternative sets of industry dummies: the first set includes 
all individual industrial sector dummies that exist in our database. The second set is an 
alternative way to control for sector specific heterogeneity that additionally allows us to 
test whether a specific group of sectors identified in the literature as particularly sensi 
tive to IPR protection also holds in the case of our transition economies: the group of 
d_Depend consists of the three industries “chemicals and chemical products” (NACE 
24), “machinery and equipment, not elsewhere classified” (NACE 29), and “electrical 
machinery and apparatus, not elsewhere classified” (NACE 31). The sectors typically 
considered  as  rather  independent  of  the  IPR  system,  grouped  into  the  dummy 
d_Independ,  includes  “food  products  and  beverages”  (NACE  15),  “basic  metals” 
(NACE 27), and “other transport equipment” (NACE 35). Both dummies may be used 
simultaneously in the analysis, because they only cover the six most distinct of the 22 
sectors that form part of our database.  
                                                 
8   In fact, we record a pairwise correlation coefficient of 0.979 for our set of countries.  
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5  Method of Analysis 
The development of hypotheses already shows that there is no general comprehensive 
and closed model for the behaviour and characteristics of FDI subsidiaries in countries 
with differing IPR regimes. We therefore have to analyse in a rather explorative manner 
and even though our hypotheses are derived from theory and related empirical research, 
theories do not predict or explain particular directions of causality for any of our hy 
potheses. As a result, we cannot test regression models (e.g. probit or logit) and have to 
use correlation analysis, a somewhat weaker method of analysis and yet strong enough 
to identify significant relationships and find support or refute our hypotheses. 
In order to make sure that the resulting correlations are not spurious, omitting third vari 
ables, we use a partial correlation method. This measures the degree of association be 
tween two variables, randomly selected from our list of factors, and removes the effect 
of the rest of the factors as controlling variables by holding them constant. This allows 
us to control for effects of third variables that may have an influence on both variables 
of a pairwise correlation. We specify several sets of correlation analysis as partial corre 
lations, involving the indicators and control variables variably in full and in sub groups. 
The robustness of our results in those correlation groups can be tested by various exten 
sions and alterations of factors and dummies included. Because some of our data is on 
an ordinal scale, we use partial rank correlations9: 
( ) ( )( )
, , ,
, / 2 2
, , 1 1
X Y X U Y U
X Y U







  (i) 
with X being the sensitivity of FDI subsidiaries to the strength of the IPR regime in the 
host economy, and Y the randomly selected variable from our list of factors. U denotes 
the rest of our factors that are used as controlling variables. The partial correlation tests 
linear regressions between X and U as well as between Y and U. The correlation coeffi 
cient  ( ) , / X Y U τ  is the correlation between the residuals of the linear regressions. 
In our partial correlation analysis, we test four correlations, the first (partial correlation 1) 
includes only the factors that we derive from the literature plus the control factors and 
dummies. This will tell us whether the results and assumptions discussed in the litera 
ture are also valid for foreign investments in our selection of countries in Central East 
Europe. The factors in the analysis include the strategic motives of the foreign investor 
with a view on Hypothesis 1 4, R&D for Hypothesis 5, innovations for Hypothesis 6, 
the corporate control variable of equity share for Hypothesis 7a, the augmented country 
dummy by use of the country specific IPR index, the IPR indicator of the country of 
                                                 
9   Our statistical software STATA does not offer partial Spearman rank correlation. We therefore defi 
ne rank orders for our variables in a first step (using the egen, rank command) and run normal partial 
correlations in a second step.  
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origin in the three groups, the age, size, the dummy for true MNEs, the dummy for 
greenfield investments, as well as the individual industry dummies: 
IPR sensitivity pcorr Market, Follow, Efficiency, Resources, Technology, 
R&D, Innovation, Equity share, IPR country index, Origin, Age, Size, 
d_M E, d_Green, Sector dummies  (ii) 
The second correlation analyses (partial Correlation 2) tests the same factors but substi 
tutes the individual sector dummies by the set of two sensitivity classes of sector dum 
mies, d_Independ and d_Depend to test whether the specific set of sectors identified in the 
literature as particularly sensitive to IPR protection also holds in the case of our transition 
economies: 
IPR sensitivity pcorr Market, Follow, Efficiency, Resources, Technology, 
R&D, Innovation, Equity share, IPR country index, Origin, Age, Size, 
d_M E, d_Green, d_Independ, d_Depend  (iii) 
The  third  correlation analyses (partial Correlation 3) returns to the individual sector 
dummies replacing the two sensitivity classes of sector dummies and includes addition 
ally the new corporate governance factor of Autonomy to test Hypothesis 7b and the new 
networking variable of Coop comparison to test for hypothesis 8: 
IPR sensitivity pcorr Market, Follow, Efficiency, Resources, Technology, 
R&D, Innovation, Equity share, Autonomy, Coop comparison, IPR country  
index, Origin, Age, Size, d_M E, d_Green, Sector dummies  (iv) 
The final correlation analyses (partial Correlation 4) tests the same specification as in 
Correlation Analysis 3 but again replaces the individual sector dummies by the two sen 
sitivity classes of sector dummies: 
IPR sensitivity pcorr Market, Follow, Efficiency, Resources, Technology, 
R&D, Innovation, Equity share, Autonomy, Coop comparison, IPR country  
index, Origin, Age, Size, d_M E, d_Green, d_Independ, d_Depend  (v) 
Before we actually start with our partial correlation analyses, we test for significant and 
high rank pairwise correlations between all our factors. This is to ensure that informa 
tion contained within one factor is not significantly duplicated by another. The individ 
ual results for all factors therefore contain information independent from the other fac 
tors. Table 2 shows that no significant Spearman rank correlations are in fact higher than 
0.5, so all variables may be included in the partial correlation analyses. The highest cor 
relation (with a coefficient of 0.44) is between the IPR country index and Origin, our 
indicator for the strength of the IPR regime in the country of origin of the foreign inves 
tor (which suggests that firms that invest in Romania and Croatia, as the countries with 
the lowest IPR country indices, appear to originate from countries with likewise lower 
levels of IPR protection – not a surprising result).  
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6  Results of Analysis 
The results of our four partial correlation analyses show a large extent of consistency 
with respect to variables tested as being significant and their signs (see Table 3): only in 
the cases of the strategic motive of following key clients, the size of subsidiaries, and 
the  greenfield dummy  are  variables  not  consistently  significant  in  all  correlation 
specifications. Moreover, we are able to test quite a number of significant variables 
amongst the set of factors tested. The number of cases considered in the analysis (i.e. 
omitting the cases with missing values) is also quite large. All this suggests that results 
are rather robust and warrants further discussion of results. 
The separate treatment of the sector dummies between the specifications 1/3 against 2/4 
(substituting individual sector dummies with the two group dummies) likewise did not 
change results in a structured way – both kinds of specifications appear to produce valid 
results. The fact that both of the two group sector dummies for independent vs depend 
ent sectors turn out to be insignificant further suggests that the groupings identified by 
the literature do not appear to apply to our selection of transition economies. 
The discrimination between significant and insignificant results and the signs of signifi 
cant results provide us with some indication of the hypotheses to be tested. The signifi 
cant and positive results for the strategic motive of market access in all four specifica 
tions lend support to Hypothesis 1, suggesting that, in an environment of weak IPR re 
gimes, the more important the strategic motive of the foreign investor to access a new 
market or to increase the existing share on the domestic market, the more it may afford 
to be sensitive to the strength of the IPR system in the host economy (i.e. either receive 
technology from the foreign investor or purchase technology itself). Support for our Hy 
pothesis 2 is only found in the first of our correlation analyses and hence remains an 
open issue – a result too weak to follow up on this. 
We do however consistently find support for our Hypothesis 3 on location bound natu 
ral resources: this strategic motive appears to coincide with higher levels of IPR sensi 
tivity. For Hypothesis 4, we would have expected significant and negative correlation 
coefficients, but none of the correlation specifications turned out to be significant, we 
hence are not able to find support for this hypothesis. 
Do foreign subsidiaries that are particularly sensitive to IPR protection conduct more 
technological activities (i.e. innovation and R&D) or rather less? The literature remains 
ambiguous, yet our results offer a consistent answer for the case of FDI in our transition 
economies: we obtain a significant opposite (positive) sign. The more subsidiaries are 
sensitive to IPR protection, the more likely they are to produce innovations and spend 
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Foreign parents investing in weaker IPR regimes may use corporate control mechanisms 
to prevent the unlawful leakage of intellectual property. The two most important corpo 
rate governance instruments, equity share and autonomy in business functions, are con 
sidered in our analysis. In fact, we are interested in both the relationship between sub 
sidiary sensitivity and each of the two instruments separately as well as in the relation 
ship between the two instruments: are they substitutional or do they rather complemen 
tary? The results suggest that equity share is not significantly correlated with subsidiary 
sensitivity, whereas autonomy consistently is. This tells us that a higher equity share is 
not typically used as corporate control instrument to protect the investor’s ownership 
advantage. Limiting subsidiary autonomy, however, does appear to be a significant in 
strument. With respect to the relationship between the two, we did test each of the in 
struments individually (not reported): autonomy always turned out to be significant and 
equity share never. This means that we are unable to test for either substitutionality nor 
complementarity for foreign direct investors in our transition economies. In terms of our 
hypotheses, this means that we have to refute Hypothesis 7a whilst we find some indica 
tion for Hypothesis 7b, which is new to the literature. 
As a further addition to the body of knowledge on the FDI IPR issue, we tested whether 
subsidiaries that are particularly sensitive to IPR protection would attach less weight on 
cooperating with the local host economy innovation system, here proxied by unspecified 
other domestic firms and other domestic organisations (Hypothesis 8). In fact, our par 
tial correlation analyses suggest that this hypothesis may in fact be true: we consistently 
find significant positive coefficients. In terms of economic policy, this result has the im 
portant implication that in order to promote technology and knowledge transfer from 
foreign direct investment subsidiaries, a sufficiently high level of IPR protection should 
be guaranteed. Our analysis, however, does not allow us to make a statement on the op 
timal strength of the IPR regime. 
From the results, we also find support for the case that the stronger the IPR regime in a 
given host economy (denoted by the factor IPR country index), the more will FDI re 
ceive sensitive technology from the parent company (ownership advantage) or will be 
willing to pay for sensitive technology worthy of protection – yet again an obvious indi 
cation for the kind of economic policy that aims at exploiting the potentials for technol 
ogy transfer via FDI. With respect to our test for the influence of the strength of the IPR 
regime in the foreign investor’s own home country, our results do not allow us to draw 
any conclusions, all coefficients remain insignificant. This was already indicated by the 
pairwise  correlation  analysis,  where  the  IPR  regimes  of  host  and  home  economies 
showed a high, positive, and significant correlation. 
What this analytical method left unanswered so far is the characterisation of industries 
according to their specific sensitivity to IPR protection in the transition economies of 
CEE – we were able to refute the list of industries from the literature but we still remain 
to provide an alternative list for our transition economies. There could be different rea  
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sons for this finding. The distinction between IPR sensitive sectors and IPR insensitive 
sectors was developed in the mid 1980 and technological evolution in those industries 
may contort the attempt to make a clear distinction between the former IPR  sensitive 
and IPR insensitive sectors provided by the industries. If the different pace of the tech 
nological evolution between sectors over the last decades is indeed the answer for in 
consistencies between the IPR sensitivity of the literature and the IPR sensitivity found 
in our dataset, then it is insufficient to add one by one new studied sectors to the group 
of sensitive or insensitive sectors. To account for the factor of time, it is rather needed to 
run a whole new analysis for the IPR sensitivity by sectors in distinct time intervals.  
Such a repetition of Mansfield sector analysis could make a case for the relevance of the 
factor time in relation with the IPR sensitivity of different industries. Another possible 
explanation for the difference between the “traditional” IPR sensitivity of sectors in the 
literature and the IPR sensitivity of sectors found in our dataset is obviously the fact that 
the FDI subsidiaries are placed in transition economies of East Europe. The question 
arises, if there is a reason that those particular sectors in the observed countries behave 
differently towards FDI than their counterparts in other countries. Is there something 
special in East Europe that influences the sector behaviour? To address this question, 
further study is required. 
Still, those differences do not produce a totally different picture in our data: some of the 
“traditional” industries remain IPR sensitive, but new ones join this group whilst others 
appear not to be that sensitive any more or in the transition context (see Table 4). The 
often mentioned chemical and pharmaceutical industry (both included in “chemicals and 
chemical products”, NACE 24) remains one of the most sensitive industries towards the 
IPR regime with an industry average level of 1.8210. Beyond this, the sector specific 
average indicator for IPR sensitivity over all our FDI subsidiaries turns out to be highest 
for the sector of “paper and paper products” (NACE 21). It should not be surprising that 
“manufacturing  of  medical,  precision  and  optical  instruments,  watches  and  clocks” 
(NACE 33) also forms part of the sectors that are rather IPR sensitive – both were not 
included in previous studies. The forth sector with a high sensitivity is the sector of 
“fabricated metal products, except machinery and equipment” (NACE 28) which also 
was not identified as particularly sensitive in the previous studies. 
The  four  sectors  with  the  lowest  IPR sensitivity  in our study are “manufacturing of 
wood and wood products and articles of straw and plainting material” (NACE 20), “ra 
dio, television and communication equipment and apparatus” (NACE 32) (note that this 
industry is represented by only one firm), “wearing apparel; dressing and dyeing of fur” 
(NACE 18), and “office, accounting and computing machinery” (NACE 30). Amongst 
                                                 
10   The index assumes the highest value of 2, if all subsidiaries in this industry attach particularly high 
importance to first the acquisition of external knowledge as source for R&D and innovation and se 
cond to existing technology from the MNE group embodied in products already produced without 
substantial adjustments. The lowest value of 0 would signify that all subsidiaries do not attach signi 
ficant importance to either source of knowledge.  
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those, “manufacturing of radio, television and communication equipment and appara 
tus” (NACE 32) is quite close to what the literature calls “electrical equipment” and 
holds as particularly IPR sensitive. 
Table 4: 
Sectors according to their sensitivity to IPR protection (IPR sensitivity) 
NACE Sector: Manufacturing of ...  Mean  obs.  C1  C2  C3  C4  C5 
paper and paper products (21)  1.82  11  0  22  0  11  67 
medical, precision and optical instruments, watches and clocks 
(33) 
1.63  8  0  60  0  0  40 
chemicals and chemical products (24)  1.61  23  14  14  0  29  43 
fabricated metal products, except machinery and equipment (28)  1.55  33  12  12  44  20  12 
other non metallic mineral products (26)  1.46  35  17  4  17  13  50 
basic metals (27)  1.42  12  13  13  13  38  25 
furniture (36)  1.42  26  30  13  35  13  9 
other transport equipment (35)  1.33  9  14  14  29  43  0 
rubber and plastic products (25)  1.32  25  29  19  14  14  24 
electrical machinery and apparatus, not elsewhere classified (31)  1.32  34  11  11  15  37  26 
food products and beverages (15)  1.28  60  9  9  45  23  14 
textiles (17)  1.26  27  42  26  16  11  5 
motor vehicles, trailers and semi trailers (34)  1.25  16  0  7  21  21  50 
Recycling (36)  1.25  4  25  0  0  25  50 
machinery and equipment, not elsewhere classified (29)  1.23  35  14  7  18  32  29 
Publishing, printing and reproduction of recorded media (22)  1.11  9  14  14  29  29  14 
leather, luggage, handbags, saddlery, harness, and footwear (19)  1.00  17  21  43  14  21  0 
wood & wood products, articles of straw & plainting material (20)  1.00  18  50  7  0  36  7 
radio, television and communication equipment and apparatus (32)  1.00  7  25  0  50  0  25 
wearing apparel; dressing and dyeing of fur (18)  0.83  36  36  15  27  12  9 
office, accounting and computing machinery (30)  0.00  1  100  0  0  0  0 
C1 through C4 are the percentages of firms belonging to the specific four groups in the cluster analysis. The figures 
in bold represent a dominant (i.e. >50%) allocation of firms in one group. C1 is the least sensitive group whilst C2 
and C5 have the highest averages of IPR sensitivity. C3 and C4 are very close to each other and assume the middle 
ground. 
Source:  IWH FDI database. 
A further hierarchical cluster analysis (with the Gower specification, because we have 
mixed  data between binary,  discrete,  and  continuous  variables)  uses the factors that 
turned out to be significant in the partial correlation analysis to group firms into indus 
tries according to their common behaviour and characteristics with respect to IPR pro 
tection. This way, we are able to use all information that plays a role in determining cor 
porate control of subsidiaries and the selection of their trade and networking partners for 
their own technological activity with respect to the strength of IPR protection in the host 
economy. The results are hence richer than the pure average measure for IPR sensitivity  
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and produces a more robust measure of industry specific levels of sensitivity to IPR pro 
tection in transition economies. The cluster analysis was cut off at 5 groups11, whereby 
C2 and C5 have a higher average IPR sensitivity index with 1.771 and 1.587 respec 
tively,  C1  has  the  lowest  average  sensitivity index  with  0.348,  and  C3  and  C4  are 
somewhere in the middle with indices of 1.291 and 1.351 respectively. We hence use 
C2 and C5 as groups of firms with above average sensitivity to IPR protection and con 
trast this to C1 as the group with below average sensitivity industries. 
The results of the cluster analysis tell us that the five industries of “paper and paper 
products”  (NACE  21)  and  “medical, precision  and  optical  instruments,  watches  and 
clocks” (NACE 33), “other non metallic mineral products” (NACE 26), “motor vehi 
cles, trailers and semi trailers” (NACE 34), and “Recycling” (NACE 36) belong to the 
two most sensitive clusters: of all firms in these industries, more than 50 per cent appear 
in the clusters C2 and C5. In comparison to the analysis using IPR sensitivity averages, 
the cluster analysis allocates only 43 per cent of firms in NACE 24 (which includes 
chemical  and  pharmaceutical  industries)  into  the  second  most  sensitive  cluster  and  
14 per cent in the most sensitive cluster. This constitutes a close miss with respect to our 
50 per cent criterion. NACE 21 and NACE 33 appear to be sensitive in both analyses. 
Amongst  the insensitive sectors, our criterion for the cluster analysis only identifies 
“wood & wood products, articles of straw & plainting material” (NACE 20) and “office, 
accounting  and  computing  machinery”  (NACE  30).  This  supports  the  results  of  the 
analysis using IPR sensitivity averages, even though NACE 32 and NACE 18 are not 
identified in our cluster analysis. In sum, of the three “traditional” IPR sensitive sectors, 
only one corresponds to our results, and all “traditional” less sensitive sectors appear in 
the middle ground in our analysis. 
                                                 
11   The decision to cut off at 5 groups is guided by the Calinski and Harabasz (1974) pseudo F and Du 
da and Hart’s (1973) Je(2)/Je(1), both of which start to strongly decline after 5 clusters, combined 
with the rule by Duda/Hart pseudo T squared, which shows a low plateau at 5 groups and starts to ri 
se strongly for 6 groups (the next local minimum appears for 11 groups). See the annex for the res 
pective rule tables and the usual dendogram.  
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7  Discussion of Results in Light of Economic Policy 
The issue of FDI and in fact technology attraction is typically focussed upon issues re 
lated to the technological ability of the host economy, including absorptive capacities 
(Cohen and Levinthal, 1990), on endowment with human capital (see e.g. UNCTAD 
2005, pp. 184, 203 206), on (backward) linkages and spillovers (Cantwell and Piscitello 
2002), as well as the capabilities of the national and regional innovation system and 
their ability to integrate the business sector, research and education institutions, as well 
as the administration and government sectors into a functioning network (triple helix: 
Etzkowitz 2008). Important as these issues certainly are, our paper takes an institutional 
focus on IPR regimes, an issue largely overlooked in this kind of literature. 
Where IPR is considered in the political economy of development studies, there is an 
open debate about the pros and cons of a regulatory regime that effectively and strictly 
enforces the protection of intellectual property rights: it is argued that it would be to the 
detriment of (least) developing countries to enforce a strong IPR regime, because this 
could deprive them of access to modern knowledge and technology (e.g. Legèr 2007). 
Some of the literature argues that catching up in the newly industrialised countries of 
Central East Asia was build to some degree on imitation of existing (and insufficiently 
protected) knowledge (for a review and discussion of this, see: Emmert et al. 2005,  
p. 40 42). 
However, our results show that in the case of transition economies, a strong IPR regime 
is –overall– beneficial for an economy hosting foreign direct investment subsidiaries: 
first, we find some indication that the stronger the IPR regime in the host economy, the 
more will subsidiaries tend to receive sensitive knowledge and technology from the for 
eign parent and tend to purchase technology from abroad. We also find support for the 
case that subsidiaries, that are thereby rather sensitive to IPR protection, also tend to be 
technologically more active. In addition, we find that our subsidiaries may have enter 
tained more cooperation activities with partners in the host economy and outside their 
transnational investors’ network, if the IPR regime would have been stronger. They may 
also have been able to act more autonomously with respect to their own business func 
tions. Both would have resulted in more interesting and hence valuable FDI for the host 
economy. Our results also show that a strong IPR regime may not be as important an is 
sue for market seekers and natural resource seekers than for foreign investors that aim 
to benefit from location bound knowledge, skills, and technology. 
It is important to note, however, that an IPR regime alone will not be sufficient to tap 
the full potential of international technology transfer. Rather, a mix of other policies is 
needed which could include, following Maskus (2000, p. 2), “promoting political stabil 
ity, encouraging flexible labor markets and building labor skills, continuing to liberalize 
markets, and developing forward looking regulatory regimes in services, investment, in 
tellectual property, and competition policy.” Other instruments to attract FDI may in  
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clude the host country’s guarantee of good infrastructure supplies, transparency in poli 
cies and regulations, and stability in the government (Kalemli Oczan et al. 2003), while 
Grubert and Mutti (1991) find evidence that FDI flows react more to international varia 
tions in taxes and incentives. 
Some of these possible conditions to attract inflowing FDI that carries sensitive knowl 
edge is already fulfilled in most transition economies of Central East Europe: member 
ship in the European Union grants transnational companies access to the large EU mar 
kets that are not only fairly liberalised and deregulated but also offer political stability 
and a modern infrastructure. Alas, the strength of IPR regimes is lower in this region as 
compared to the Western EU member countries. The design of a IPR system conducive 
to technological development is not at all a straight forward task: the IPR regime has to 
find a balance between the guarantee for an inventor to exploit his invention (which of 
ten involve, but do not necessarily have to generate in all cases monopoly market posi 
tions that result in high prices, limited access, and exclusive use of technologies, or in 
patent blocking and fencing UNCTAD 1996). On the other side, the IPR regime has to 
make sure that the benefit of innovation for the society is higher than the costs of the 
monopoly involved.  
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Annex 
Table A1: 
Calinski/Harabasz pseudo F 
                             
                              1 1 1 15 5 5 5                                                           2 2 2 21 1 1 1. . . .1 1 1 14 4 4 4                       
                              1 1 1 14 4 4 4                                                           2 2 2 21 1 1 1. . . .6 6 6 69 9 9 9                       
                              1 1 1 13 3 3 3                                                           2 2 2 22 2 2 2. . . .2 2 2 23 3 3 3                       
                              1 1 1 12 2 2 2                                                           2 2 2 22 2 2 2. . . .6 6 6 64 4 4 4                       
                              1 1 1 11 1 1 1                                                           2 2 2 24 4 4 4. . . .3 3 3 36 6 6 6                       
                              1 1 1 10 0 0 0                                                           2 2 2 24 4 4 4. . . .7 7 7 77 7 7 7                       
                                     9 9 9 9                                                           2 2 2 25 5 5 5. . . .4 4 4 42 2 2 2                       
                                     8 8 8 8                                                           2 2 2 27 7 7 7. . . .0 0 0 01 1 1 1                       
                                     7 7 7 7                                                           2 2 2 28 8 8 8. . . .3 3 3 30 0 0 0                       
                                     6 6 6 6                                                           3 3 3 30 0 0 0. . . .0 0 0 02 2 2 2                       
                                     5 5 5 5                                                           3 3 3 32 2 2 2. . . .4 4 4 43 3 3 3                       
                                     4 4 4 4                                                           3 3 3 32 2 2 2. . . .2 2 2 23 3 3 3                       
                                     3 3 3 3                                                           3 3 3 32 2 2 2. . . .6 6 6 69 9 9 9                       
                                     2 2 2 2                                                           2 2 2 20 0 0 0. . . .6 6 6 62 2 2 2                       
                             
   clusters      pseudo-F    
   Number of     Harabasz    
                 Calinski/   





                                           
                              1 1 1 15 5 5 5                                                    0 0 0 0. . . .7 7 7 73 3 3 36 6 6 60 0 0 0                                                    9 9 9 9. . . .6 6 6 69 9 9 9                       
                              1 1 1 14 4 4 4                                                    0 0 0 0. . . .8 8 8 80 0 0 00 0 0 05 5 5 5                                                    9 9 9 9. . . .2 2 2 22 2 2 2                       
                              1 1 1 13 3 3 3                                                    0 0 0 0. . . .8 8 8 80 0 0 03 3 3 33 3 3 3                                                    9 9 9 9. . . .0 0 0 06 6 6 6                       
                              1 1 1 12 2 2 2                                                    0 0 0 0. . . .8 8 8 81 1 1 18 8 8 85 5 5 5                                                    9 9 9 9. . . .5 5 5 54 4 4 4                       
                              1 1 1 11 1 1 1                                                    0 0 0 0. . . .8 8 8 83 3 3 35 5 5 51 1 1 1                                                    5 5 5 5. . . .5 5 5 53 3 3 3                       
                              1 1 1 10 0 0 0                                                    0 0 0 0. . . .7 7 7 79 9 9 99 9 9 91 1 1 1                                             1 1 1 11 1 1 1. . . .5 5 5 56 6 6 6                       
                                     9 9 9 9                                                    0 0 0 0. . . .7 7 7 74 4 4 44 4 4 41 1 1 1                                             1 1 1 13 3 3 3. . . .0 0 0 07 7 7 7                       
                                     8 8 8 8                                                    0 0 0 0. . . .8 8 8 85 5 5 58 8 8 83 3 3 3                                             1 1 1 12 2 2 2. . . .0 0 0 05 5 5 5                       
                                     7 7 7 7                                                    0 0 0 0. . . .8 8 8 85 5 5 51 1 1 16 6 6 6                                             1 1 1 12 2 2 2. . . .5 5 5 55 5 5 5                       
                                     6 6 6 6                                                    0 0 0 0. . . .7 7 7 78 8 8 85 5 5 56 6 6 6                                             1 1 1 18 8 8 8. . . .2 2 2 28 8 8 8                       
                                     5 5 5 5                                                    0 0 0 0. . . .8 8 8 84 4 4 40 0 0 02 2 2 2                                             1 1 1 14 4 4 4. . . .6 6 6 64 4 4 4                       
                                     4 4 4 4                                                    0 0 0 0. . . .8 8 8 84 4 4 45 5 5 56 6 6 6                                             2 2 2 22 2 2 2. . . .8 8 8 82 2 2 2                       
                                     3 3 3 3                                                    0 0 0 0. . . .8 8 8 82 2 2 28 8 8 89 9 9 9                                             3 3 3 30 0 0 0. . . .3 3 3 34 4 4 4                       
                                     2 2 2 2                                                    0 0 0 0. . . .8 8 8 82 2 2 24 4 4 41 1 1 1                                             4 4 4 41 1 1 1. . . .4 4 4 40 0 0 0                       
                                     1 1 1 1                                                    0 0 0 0. . . .9 9 9 94 4 4 43 3 3 33 3 3 3                                             2 2 2 20 0 0 0. . . .6 6 6 62 2 2 2                       
                                           
   clusters     Je(2)/Je(1)    T-squared   
   Number of                   pseudo      
                        Duda/Hart           
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Figure A1: 
Dendogram for the cluster analysis 
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